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ABSTRACT
This reception history of “original sin” displays how the theological conception
developed as an idea throughout Western Christianity. This paper performs a critical and in-depth
reading of the creation story from Genesis 3 and provides six thematic questions that are
discussed through the various interpretations of four major thinkers: Augustine of Hippo,
Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and Friedrich Nietzsche. These four thinkers show how
“original sin” has never been as established or canonical within Western Christianity as many
have characterized it.
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1
INTRODUCTION
In the Modern Western world, there is a loose but popular conception of “original sin.”
Found in Roman Catholicism as well as Protestantism1, this Christian belief generally relies on
the belief that human sin and all of its components – death, materiality, and finitude – first
occurred during the ‘Fall’ when the first man and woman disobeyed God and ate from the
forbidden Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. As a result of their disobedience, Adam and Eve
are believed in Western Christianity, from that moment on, to have been doomed to a state of
sinfulness. As the descendants of Adam and Eve, humans were then doomed to inherit that sinful
nature, and atone for the crime that Adam and the woman had committed. Although humans'
sinful nature would remain, Christ's death and resurrection were believed to be the solution to
this problem.
This is a familiar story and one that most Western peoples, Christian or not, have heard in
some form. Within North American Christianity, it is one of, if not the, most important tenets or
beliefs that drives evangelism and missionary efforts. Yet the popular conception of “original sin”
is grounded in an interpretation of the Genesis creation story that not all Christians have shared.
In fact, it is only one of several. However, because the story has become so engrained in Modern
Western culture, we are not encouraged to investigate the history of the development of this
particular interpretation. This thesis will aim to dispel this problem in order to illustrate how the
popular “original sin” story is not as simple as many of us have been led to believe.
The word ‘sin’ itself presents an interesting challenge. I began this project after learning
that the Greek word which is often translated as “sin” in the New Testament, hamartia, has

1

This conception is rather muted in Eastern Orthodoxy where Orthodox tradition has focused on theosis and its
possibility for human perfectibility. Though that fact deserves attention and investigation, this paper will focus
on the Western conception. The Eastern position has often been summarized in Athanasius’ famous quote that
often says to some effect, “God became man in order that men could become gods.”
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mostly been translated in Aristotle’s Poetics as a “missing of the mark.” This investigation into
the older Greek philosophical understanding of hamartia – as seen in Aristotle's Poetics - and its
theological implications ultimately led to the realization that many of sin's linguistic counterparts
also presented similar challenges. ‘Sin’ does not have the same semantic range in Hebrew (chet),
Greek (hamartia), or Latin (peccatum) as it does in Modern English, and since every translation
is also an interpretation, these differences may have led to different interpretations of the Genesis
creation story. Although the most famous and influential early Christian theologian, Augustine,
receives credit for developing the interpretation of the Fall as most Western Christians conceive
of it, he was not the only thinker who attempted to make sense of the Genesis story at the time.
As the translational differences and discrepancies among these four languages suggest, there may
be many ways to read the story of Adam and the woman in the garden and thus, the very idea of
“original sin.” For the purposes of this paper, I will examine the Genesis creation story in
chapters 3-6 and trace the origins of the idea that “original sin” appeared in Chapter 3, through a
reception history involving four major thinkers who have contributed to the current popular
understanding, or aimed to dismantle and change it: Augustine of Hippo (354-430), Thomas
Aquinas (1225- 1274), Martin Luther (1483-1546), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900).
Through this examination of the biblical text and these four important thinkers, I will illustrate
how “original sin” as an idea developed through Western Christian theological controversy, and
hope to display how the current understanding of “original sin” is one that has changed and may
continue to change, over time.

3
Chapter One: Beginning in Genesis
For almost two millennia Western Christianity has associated the doctrine of “original sin”
with the book of Genesis. From early church fathers such as Irenaeus, Origen, and Augustine, to
medieval and Reformation theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther, Christianity
has utilized the first four chapters of the first book of the Hebrew Bible in order to search for the
inception and explanation of humanity's “fallen” nature. Yet Western scholars and laypeople
alike have taken for granted this seemingly obvious connection, failing to take note of the
important subtleties and intricacies within the Genesis story. Despite the presence of two Genesis
accounts of creation, for the sake of this project I will focus primarily on the account in Genesis
3, to which the majority of Christians have looked as the point of the inception of “original sin.”2
Genesis 3 is pertinent to this inquiry because it details God's command to Adam and Eve as well
as the infamous exchange between the serpent and the woman and its cataclysmic aftermath.
Though Genesis 3 pertains to the Fall of Adam and the woman, it begins with important
information about another one of God's creatures: the serpent. The serpent is the first character
whom readers encounter when the chapter begins and the text quickly makes it clear that “the
serpent was more crafty than any other beast of the field that the Lord God had made” (Gen 3:1).
This abruptly becomes evident when the serpent asks the woman if God actually told her not to
eat from any of the trees in the garden. She responds that, though God told them to eat from any
of the trees in the garden “God [also] said, 'You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the
midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you die'” (Gen 3:3). It is interesting that God
suggests death as a consequence of eating from the tree that is in the middle of the garden in light
of how God later deals with Adam and the woman since they do not die at first. Yet it is also a
2

This paper is fully aware of the effects translations can have on interpretations, and for that reason, I have
consulted numerous texts. Though I have primarily relied on the English Standard Version Bible for continuity, I
have also consulted the Latin Vulgate and two versions of the Torah, which are listed in the bibliography.
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significant aspect of the passage that there is no mention of “sin.” Though it is unclear whether
Adam and the woman are immortal at this stage, death seems to be the main concern of the text.
It is this concern that the serpent latches onto when he assures the woman that “You will not
surely die” (Gen 3:4), a clever half-truth that the reader can spot later when Adam's death is
recounted in Genesis 5:5. Instead of promising the woman that she will live forever if she eats
from the tree, the serpent explains to her that “God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will
be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen 3:5).
The fact that the serpent emphasizes this last point is the most telling and troublesome for
the “original sin” interpretation of the story. By promising the woman that she will know the
difference between good and evil, the serpent insinuates that she and Adam lack any ability to
judge the difference at the time. Therefore, it is hard to argue that Adam and the woman knew
that it was evil to eat from the tree when it appears that they did not have the concept of such
knowledge, which is in addition to the fact that the serpent was a fellow creature in the garden
whom they had no reason to distrust. There is no mention of Satan in Genesis 3, and it would be
many centuries before later Christians would hold “Satan” responsible for tempting Adam and
the woman. Some rabbinical commentary before Christianity would also theorize that the devil
had played a part in the garden, but Satan would play a tantamount role for Christian
interpretation. Thus this scene merely illustrates that Adam and the woman do not possess the
knowledge of good and evil, but may desire the knowledge, as well as the greater promise that
this knowledge would imply: being like God. Here once again the story is complicated, since the
serpent does not mention the attraction of disobedience or rebellion. Instead he approaches Adam
and the woman as two children who wish to be adults like their father. This scheme makes the
serpent's proposition look good and reasonable, but also displays how innocent and childish
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Adam and the woman appear to be, and that perhaps their intentions could be good, even though
they are disobedient. When the woman picks the fruit, she gets confirmation of what the serpent
told her: that the fruit was “good for food” (Gen. 3:6), and “a delight to the eyes” (Gen. 3:6), and
that “it was desired to make one wise” (Gen. 3:6). The child-like trust the woman displays in the
serpent also appears between her and Adam “who was with her... and ate” (Gen. 3:6). There is no
trace of suspicion, doubt, or even much deliberation before they eat. They listen to the serpent,
see what he tells them, and they both eat. Then the scene climatically informs the reader that “the
eyes of both were opened” (Gen. 3:7). Nowhere does the text suggest that this implies an onset
of “sin.”
The ramifications of Adam's and the woman's decision is initially unclear, but its
importance is underlined. The phrase “the eyes of both were opened” implies a change in seeing
that is both psychological and physical since they quickly realize that they are naked. But it also
lends support to the evidence that neither possessed the sort of rational or perfect intelligence
such as later theologians would assign to them. In fact, their reaction to eating from the tree and
having their eyes opened indicates that they are suddenly embarrassed by their nudity for “they
sewed fig leaves together and made themselves loincloths” (Gen 3:7) as soon as they realized
that they were naked. Whether they are embarrassed because the fruit made them aware of how
little they knew or because they are actually naked is not clear, but it is interesting that they
appear to be more bothered by their nakedness than by what they have done. When God appears
in the garden and calls out to them, Adam replies that “I heard the sound of you in the garden,
and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself” (Gen 3:10). Adam does not say that he
was afraid because he ate from the tree that was forbidden; he was afraid because he was naked.
Curiously enough, God also focuses on their nakedness, but asks a strange question: “Who told
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you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?”
(Gen. 3: 11). God immediately connects the knowledge of their nakedness with eating from the
tree, but does not draw the conclusion that they have eaten. Instead, he asks who told them of
their nudity. By asking this, the text seems to imply that God was aware of something or
someone possessing the ability to educate Adam and the woman about their condition, and that
he places more blame on that creature than on them. It also implies that God possessed the same
type of hope as a parent who knows his or her child has done something wrong but still hopes
that the child did not. When God asks the woman what she did and she confesses that “'the
serpent deceived me, and I ate'” (Gen. 3:13), God begins doling out punishment. But he does not
begin with Adam or the woman.
The doctrine of “original sin” in the West has often focused on the consequences of
Adam's and the woman's decision to eat from the forbidden tree, but has often ignored the
structure of those consequences. God does not punish Adam and the woman as soon as he learns
that they disobeyed Him. Instead, He punishes the serpent, stating that “[b]ecause you have done
this, cursed are you above all livestock, and above all beasts of the field; on your belly you shall
go and dust you shall eat all the days of your life” (Gen. 3:14). Not only does this suggest that
God physically transformed the serpent as punishment, but he also uses the word “cursed.” He
does not use this form with the woman when He turns to her and assigns her painful childbirth
and subordination to her husband, creating a hierarchy between the two human beings. Neither
does God curse Adam. God proclaims “[b]ecause you have listened to the voice of your woman
and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, 'You shall not eat of it', cursed is the
ground because of you” (Gen. 3:17). God curses the earth and assigns Adam to its maintenance “in pain you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you;
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and you shall eat the plants of the field. By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread till you
return to the ground” (Gen 3: 17-19) – but God does not explicitly “curse” Adam or the woman.
However, God does suggest that death will be a consequence of their actions, reminding Adam
that “out of it [the ground] you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gen. 3:
19). It is only now that the woman finally receives her name: Hava, the Hebrew word which
connotes “breath” or “life.” In the Septuagint, this would translate as Zoe. After God punishes
them, Adam “called his woman’s name Eve, because she was the mother of all living. And the
Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins and clothed them” (Gen. 3:20-21).3
When God expels Adam and the woman from the garden, He curiously adds the observation,
“Behold, the man has become like one of us in knowing good and evil. Now, lest he reach out his
hand and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever-” (Gen. 3:22), implying that
without the tree of life Adam and the woman will eventually die. Because of their decision, God
seems to doom them to mortal lives full of suffering and hardship but again, nowhere does He
mention sin.
The language of sin eventually does appear in Genesis, but not until Chapter 4. Here the
narrative introduces the term and also echoes language from Chapter 3, although in much
different circumstances. Sin comes into the conversation when God speaks to Cain, warning him,
“And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you must rule
over it” (Gen. 4:7-8). This passage is striking for two reasons. First, it repeats the words that God
used when he punished Eve and declared that Adam “shall rule over you” (Gen. 3: 16),
indicating a hierarchical aspect between Cain and sin that proceeds the relationship between
Adam and Eve. Second and more importantly, God mentions sin as a personified notion. Not
3

The implications in this simple sentence are quite interesting since one must wonder where God procured animal
skins. This could very possibly be the first instance of death in the story, since God must have killed some of his
animals in order to use their skins.
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only does this present a problem for the “original sin” doctrine that emphasized the presence of
sin in Genesis 3, but it also contrasts directly with the idea of sin as a state of being. If Cain had
inherited sin from Adam, it is hard to understand why God would describe sin as a lurking
presence that could be ignored. Instead, the Genesis narrative seems much more concerned with
death and pain, as Abel's murder sets off a violent chain of subsequent events.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of Genesis complicate the emerging concept of sin because of the
questions they present as the violence on earth escalates exponentially. Was sin unnamed in
Chapter 3 because Adam's and the woman's mistake was the first? Was this why God was then
able to warn Cain about it in Chapter 4? What is the connection between sin, death, and mortality?
These are the questions with which the Genesis story leaves us, and that would later obsess
Christian theologians, as the scripture tells a story of increasing corruption and violence. Though
it is unclear whether Adam and Eve brought sin into the world, the text seems to imply that their
decision, and then their son Cain's crime, produce a cumulative effect in which sin, death, and
mortality increase exponentially. After Cain murders his brother, God punishes him much more
harshly than he did Cain's parents. God admonishes Cain “[t]hat the voice of your brother's blood
is crying to me from the ground. And now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its
mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand” (Gen. 4:10-11). Echoing Chapter 3, God
uses the word “curse” again, but now directs it at Cain instead of the ground, as he had done with
Adam. This shift in orientation of God's curses towards humanity becomes more explicit as
God's anger seems to grow. Two chapters later, God declares “My spirit shall not abide in man
forever, for he is flesh: his days shall be 120 years” (Gen. 6:3). After shortening man's lifespan,
the text then describes that God saw “that the wickedness of man was great on earth, and that
every intention of the thoughts of his [man's] heart was only evil continually. And the Lord
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regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart” (Gen. 6:5-6). This
regret at his creation is so totalizing that God only spares Noah, his immediate family, and two of
every animal when he decides to wipe out the rest of creation with the flood.
The flood that God uses to destroy mankind in Genesis 7 returns to the questions with
which Genesis had left us in chapters 4, 5, and 6. The text could have been implying a narrative
of decadence, that the emergence of sin had not only brought mortality and death into the world
which only increased as man sinned more and more, but also tainted the material world and
material beings. This would certainly become a popular interpretation with many later Christian
theologians such as Martin Luther, but it would also become a significant interpretation for early
Gnostic Christians, many of whom would argue that this Genesis narrative supported their belief
that the material world was corrupt and evil. Thus one needed to escape his or her decadent and
corrupt material body as well as the world in order to return to a more divine or spiritual state.
This certainly makes some sense logically, but ironically, this would not become the dominant
interpretation of what would become “orthodoxy.” The relationship between sin, materiality, and
death that puzzle us would also puzzle early Christians and would actually fuel the theological
conflicts of the early church that would eventually lead to the dominant Augustinian
interpretation of “original sin.” In my reading, the text leaves us with six questions that
Augustine and subsequent thinkers would attempt to answer: 1) why is the woman unnamed?; 2)
How is the serpent convincing?; 3) When does death enter the scene?; 4) Why is nudity a
marker?; 5) Why do things degenerate so rapidly?; and 6) When precisely does sin enter the
story?

10

Chapter Two: Sin, the Battle over Materiality, and Augustine's Solution
As Christians sought to make sense of Christ's place in human history and his connection
to the Hebrew God, the Genesis narrative within the Septuagint drove many theologians' attempt
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to understand the relationship between Christ and the combination of sin, materiality, and death.
Yet early Christians were not unanimous in their interpretations and it was out of their debates
that ‘orthodox’ theology eventually emerged. Irenaeus (130-202), the 2nd century CE bishop of
Lyons, was one of the first early Christians to summarize the implications of this debate.
Primarily concerned with refuting Gnostic interpretations of Christ's purpose and incarnation,
especially those which denied “the whole dispensation of God, and den[ied] the salvation of the
flesh and reject[ed] its rebirth, saying that it [was] not capable of incorruption,”4 Irenaeus saw
Genesis as the beginning of the story of God's plan for the redemption of the entire material
world, especially human beings.
Emphasizing Adam's and the woman's child-like understanding, Irenaeus argued that God
utilized the sin that they had committed as the impetus for redemption and human deification.
Believing that “the human creature was not made from the beginning in its final perfection but
were rather 'like children,'”5 Irenaeus took into account Adam's and the woman's ignorance and
did not fault them for being evil or willfully disobedient. Irenaeus instead argued that the woman
“had been wickedly seduced... by the word of an angel to flee from God,”6 therefore, placing
more blame on Satan than on Eve for the emergence of sin.
Irenaeus further argued that despite the bleak consequences of Adam's and the woman's
decision, God used their mistake to conquer death once and for all through Christ. Painting
Genesis 3 as an opportunity for ultimate communion rather than as the end of paradise, Irenaeus
believed that:
4

Irenaeus. “Selections from the Work Against Heresies by Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons: 'The Refutation and
Overthrow of the Knowledge Falsely So Called.'” Early Christian Fathers. Cyril C. Richardson, ed. New York:
Touchstone, 1996. 387.
5
Justo L. Gonzalez. The Story of Christianity: Volume 1: The Early Church to the Dawn of the Reformation. San
Francisco: Harper, 1984. 69.
6
Irenaeus. “Selections from the Work Against Heresies by Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons: 'The Refutation and
Overthrow of the Knowledge Falsely So Called.'” Early Christian Fathers. Cyril C. Richardson, ed. New York:
Touchstone, 1996. 389.
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The enemy [Satan] would not have been justly conquered unless it had been a man [made]
of woman who conquered him. For it was by a woman that he had power over man from
the beginning, setting himself up in opposition to man. Because of this the Lord also
declares himself to be the Son of Man, so renewing in himself that primal man from
whom the formation [of man] by woman began, that as our race went down to death by a
man who was conquered we might ascend again to life by a man who overcame; and as
death won the palm of victory over us by a man, so we might by a man receive the palm
of victory over death.7

Irenaeus explicitly rejected not only the Gnostic beliefs that Christ had come in order to
save humans from materiality, but also the teachings of men such as Marcion and Cerdon who
taught that the God of the Old Testament was either evil or at least not the father of Christ.
Understandably, many were attracted to these views because it seemed to make sense. How
could the God who had destroyed mankind and displayed so much anger towards his creation be
connected to Christ? However, Irenaeus took great pains to refute this argument by drawing a
holistic picture of God's plan for humanity that started in Genesis and culminated in Christ.
Significantly devoted to God's plans for reconciliation with his human creation, Irenaeus'
interpretation was not only in favor of recovering the material world but would also remain the
more prevalent interpretation within Eastern Orthodoxy.8
However, despite Irenaeus' assurance of the validity of his interpretation of Genesis, he
was not the only early Christian thinker to wrestle with the creation story. Origen of Alexandria
7

Ibid, 391.
See Timothy Ware's The Orthodox Church. London: Penguin Books, 1997. 219-224. Ware's illustration of the
Eastern Orthodox interpretation of “original sin” makes it clear that the Eastern and Western churches seriously
departed in some of their views of Genesis and the definition of sin, particularly pertaining to its legal and/or
genetic nature. The Orthodox Church not only retains more of the Irenaeus interpretation but also relies more
closely on the original Greek word hamartia “missing the mark” in order to understand the purpose of the
Christian life which is theosis.
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(184/5-253/4), a major (albeit controversial) Christian theologian who wrote in the 3rd century
CE, interpreted Genesis through a much more dualistic lens. Utilizing Platonic themes most
noticeably found in the Phaedrus, Origen believed that the two Genesis accounts of creation
actually described two creations. Genesis 1 recalled God's creation of spiritual beings who had
sinned and then fallen to earth, embodied as material beings in a sort of solid creation. These
material beings were those in Genesis 2 and Genesis 3 who retained their immortal souls but
were trapped in material bodies. Origen emphasized “'that the life of the soul did not begin when
the soul was joined to the body' but that the soul had preexisted and had fallen in that earlier state
[Genesis 1].”9 Christ, on the other hand, was the only soul that had not fallen and therefore, it
was that much more significant that he had voluntarily taken on a material body. Origen did not
necessarily see materiality as evil but he did see it as inferior to the spiritual and rational essence
of the soul. Whereas Irenaeus had stressed the redemption of the material body, Origen believed
that the eventual physical resurrection of humans was simply “an allegory for the teaching that
'in the body there lies a certain principle which is not corrupted from which the body is raised in
corruption' – not the same body that died, but a body appropriate to the new and immortal life.”10
Though some praised Origen for noticing the differences between Genesis 1 and Genesis 2-3,
many criticized these beliefs as too Platonic and dualistic by placing too much emphasis on an
immortal soul in contrast to the soul in relation to the body. Once again, the issues over the
creation account in Genesis and its relation to the spiritual value of the material world caused
serious conflict. Though Origen was a skillful reader of the Bible, they were interpretations such
as these that would continue fueling the theological battle over what constituted “orthodox”
Christianity.
9

Jaroslav Pelikan. The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine – 1: The Emergence of the
Catholic Tradition (100-600). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971. 48.
10
Ibid.
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While some Christians debated what sin, redemption, and materiality meant through
Genesis, others battled over this concern in relation to Christ's birth and baptism. In his survey of
Christian anthropology, scholar Jaroslav Pelikan highlights the problems of Christ's birth and
infant baptism for early Christians. If sin, death, and materiality affected all human beings, then
how did sin spread and why had it not infected Christ? Church fathers such as Cyprian (200-258),
the 3rd century bishop of Carthage, argued that the baptism of infants proved that even children
had to atone for some inherited sin if they were baptized, implying that sin somehow passed
from generation to generation and thus, affected even babies. Later, Ambrose (340-397), the 4th
century bishop of Milan, emphasized that Christ had to be born to a virgin in order to remain free
from sin because it passed through sexual relations.11 These connections between birth, sex, and
sin tipped the scales against materiality and led some to embrace Neo-Platonism, arguing that
man was made in God's image not in regard to his body but to his rational mind which was
immaterial, or Manichaeism, which “taught that the begetting of men took place in the 'madness
and intemperance' of sexual lust and that therefore it was blasphemous to suppose that 'God
form[ed] us according to his own image' through the madness and lust of our parents.”12 Yet
these debates caused concerns not only for the understanding of Christ's incarnation but also the
church itself. These theological conflicts had been going on long before Augustine converted and
indubitably had an effect on him as he began writing and preaching. Yet although these debates
had affected Augustine and he himself had been seriously involved in both Neo-Platonist and
Manichaean groups, his solution to these questions would produce a creative explanation of
Genesis that would inspire the “original sin” doctrine so distinct from that of his predecessors.
Amid his own experiences as a young man, later a bishop in the midst of constant
11

Jaroslav Pelikan. The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine – 1: The Emergence of the
Catholic Tradition (100-600). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971. 289-291.
12
Ibid, 300.
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theological conflict, and an unstable political environment in 5th century Carthage, Augustine
developed his “original sin” formulation. All of these aspects – his life, the contemporary
theological debates, and the environment in North Africa - had a tremendous effect on how
Augustine would conceive of sin and its origins, and we must investigate each to understand how
he came to his conclusions, as well as what his conclusions actually were. By now it is no secret,
partially because of his own Confessions, that Augustine had been a typical upwardly aspiring
Roman man prior to becoming a Christian. His previous relationships as a young man,
particularly with his long-time mistress and highly educated male friends, colored some of his
attitudes towards women and sex. Like many of his mentors, conversion was problematic when it
meant that Augustine could no longer live as he once had. As a bishop, “[h]e imposed strict
codes of sexual avoidance on himself and his own clergy... [and he] would never visit a woman
unchaperoned, and did not allow even his own female relatives to enter the bishop's palace.”13
Like the debate over materiality, sexuality was a source of confusion, given its relationship to
women. The question of sexuality and its place or purpose for Christians, complicated these
debates, and Augustine was certainly not immune. His own participation in the Manichean and
Neo-Platonist groups prior to becoming a more “orthodox” Christian certainly attest to the fact
that Augustine had complex feelings concerning human sexuality. But the part sex would play in
his doctrine of “original sin” and the long-standing debate over materiality was not as simple as
the issue has often been characterized.
Augustine's doctrine of “original sin” relied on what he perceived to be the essential
human deficiency: the corruption of the human will. In his exhaustive analysis of sexuality and
early Christians, Peter Brown's book, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual

13

Peter Brown. The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988. 396.
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Renunciation in Early Christianity, illuminates how Augustine saw nothing inherently wrong
with sex or reproduction but rather saw the sexual instinct as corrupt because it clashed with the
will of God. For Augustine, “[t]he uncontrollable elements in sexual desire revealed the working
in the human person of a concupiscentia carnis, of a permanent flaw in the soul that tilted it
irrevocably towards the flesh.”14 Yet concupiscence was “such a peculiarly tragic affliction to
Augustine precisely because it had so little to do with the body... [and more to do] with a lasting
distortion of the soul itself.”15 Shockingly, unlike many of his contemporaries, Augustine's
doctrine was not anti-materialist or anti-sexual. Instead, by making a psychological connection
between sex and the soul, in which sex was merely a symptom and not the problem, Augustine
placed the responsibility for man's ills on the will and not in the body. Sex merely symbolized the
consequences of “original sin” as the evidence of how far the will had departed from following
God. The sexual drive no longer followed the divine will but “spoke, with terrible precision, of
one single, decisive event within the soul. It echoed in the body the unalterable consequence of
mankind's first sin.” 16 Augustine saw Adam’s and the woman's decisions to eat from the tree in
the garden as the moment when the human will had become corrupt because they had abused
their free will. Augustine argued:
Human nature was certainly originally created blameless and without any fault (vitium);
but the human nature by which each one of us is now born of Adam requires a physician,
because it is not healthy. All the good things, which it has by its conception, life, senses,
and mind, it has from God, its creator and maker. But the weakness which darkens and
disables these good natural qualities, as a result of which that nature needs enlightenment
and healing, did not come from the blameless maker but from from original sin (ex
14
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originali peccato), which was committed by free will (liberum arbitrium).17
What was so mournful about sexuality for Augustine, was that it was a constant reminder
of man's departure from God, of the Fall. The body and sex were not evil but they were also not
what they had originally been when man's will had acted in accord with God's. In this regard,
however, though Augustine emphasized that the Fall twisted the human will and not sex,
marriage, or the body, his wariness towards human sexuality in the fallen state “opened the
sluice-gates of Latin Christian literature, quite as drastically as had Jerome... [letting] in the hard
male puritanism that Romans relished in their ancestors and in their favorite authors.”18
Augustine's emphasis on the human will echoed the arguments of Stoic thinkers who had
elevated the human will as the center of moral decision-making and rationality. And though the
Stoics did not believe that the will was deficient, nor in “original sin,” their belief in the
capabilities of the human will made many of them suspicious of passionate emotions such as
violent anger or overwhelming sexual desire. This partnership with Stoicism in some ways
negated what Augustine had done for the discussion of materiality and sexuality since it “created
a darkened humanism that linked the pre-Christian past to the Christian present in a common
distrust of sexual pleasure,”19 and influenced much of the later Western Church's views toward
women and sexuality. But this application of Stoicism to Christianity by emphasizing the human
will highlighted the emerging culture in which Augustine developed his ideas about “original sin.”
Augustine's insistence that “original sin” had corrupted the will spoke of an uneasy social
climate in which Christians like Augustine were beginning to form a Christian culture that would
not merely live within the Roman Empire but adopt it. Augustine saw that the consequences of
17
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the Fall were in full evidence as he witnessed the theological dissension and growing threat of
barbarian invasions disrupt the North African churches. He was so upset by the inner conflict
within the church and its inability to reach cohesion that he increasingly saw merit in bringing
the order and force of the Roman government to the church. Believing “that the structures of
authority that gave cohesion to profane society might be called upon to support the Catholic
church... [and could] bring them [the people] into the unity of the Catholic Church,”20 Augustine
displayed a political and social component to his thought. Before “original sin” had contaminated
the will man would have lived in a perfect society, but because of sin men and women “were all
by birth citizens of Babylon.”21 And just as the corrupted human will necessitated the Church,
the Church needed the strength and authority of the empire. “Original sin” and its corruption of
the human will required this marriage between the Church and the power structures of the
Roman Empire. As Brown summarizes:
Only by baptism and by incorporation into the Catholic Church, a church whose basilicas
were now plainly visible in every city of the Roman world, and whose hierarchy
embraced and disciplined all forms of Christian life, would human beings be enabled to
join the one city of which Glorious things might be spoken: the Heavenly Jerusalem, the
City of God.22
In this “City of God,” the corrupt human will divorced from its reliance on God could be
repaired and “the freedom of that city [would] be one single will present in everyone free from
all evil and filled with every good.”23 But in order to get to this heavenly kingdom, the people
would need the Church and the Empire working in tandem. This emphasis on the corrupted
20
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human will, its full representation in human sexuality, and the necessity of a politically
empowered church to guide it, would drive the dominant interpretation of “original sin,” and thus
of Genesis 3, in the Western church for many centuries.
Though it has been widely discussed in previous scholarship, we should not
underestimate other key aspects of Augustine's doctrine that would become integral to the
Western Church's understanding of sin. Just as Augustine's “original sin” doctrine was a response
to the debate over materiality, it was also a response to the debate over grace and free will.
Arguing extensively against Pelagius (354-420), an ascetic monk from 4th century Britain,
Augustine's emphasis on the corruption of the human will intended to combat Pelagius' ideas that
one could be fully autonomous in one’s salvation, meaning that God had created human beings
with the ability to choose good or evil. Augustine adamantly refuted this. Not only were humans
“in possession of a will that was corrupted and tainted by sin, and which biased them toward evil
and away from God,”24 but they were also “now contaminated by sin from the moment of their
birth.”25 Augustine underlined the inevitability of a corrupt will with the emphasis that humans
inherited “original sin” from Adam and the woman, a reasoning he gained from a Latin
translation of Romans 5:12 that his opponents argued was an incorrect translation of the original
Greek, which he did not know. Like Ambrosiaster (d. 397) before him, Augustine believed that
“a reference to 'in that all have sinned' [meant] 'in whom (that is, Adam) all have sinned.”26 By
utilizing this interpretation of Paul's Greek in the letter to the Romans, Augustine persuasively
argued that humans could not claim responsibility for their salvation because they had not only
inherited death but sin as well, and thus a corrupt will, from Adam. This is significant not only
24
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because it reveals how important translations are to theology and the emerging conception of
“original sin,” as I mentioned in the Introduction, but also because Augustine's assurance that the
corrupted human will was inherited, and therefore impossible to overcome without divine
assistance, would dominate the Western Church's stance toward sin as well as continue to drive
theological debate long after Augustine's death.
For the sake of this paper, it is important that I summarize how Augustine attempted to
answer some of the questions with which we were left after reading Genesis 3. Although he did
not answer all of them, Augustine's writings do provide enough insight to answer some questions.
Though he never seems to address the fact that the woman is unnamed in Genesis 3 until after
the Fall, Augustine's wariness towards sexuality and women was evident in that he regarded
“how necessary woman was for the tempter.”27 The fact that the woman was unnamed was
irrelevant; what was relevant was that she was female and had tempted Adam into eating from
the tree and thus helped gender “original sin.” This would only make it more significant and
imperative that Mary had to be a virgin in order to give birth to Christ. If Christ was the new
Adam then Mary was the new Eve, a theological belief that would be important later on for
Martin Luther. As to when sin entered the scene in Genesis, Augustine felt confident that sin was
already present in Genesis 3, when Adam and the woman abused their free will and disobeyed
God. From that moment on, the human will had been corrupted and humans had no choice but to
sin. For Augustine, this could also perhaps explain why the world in Genesis degenerated so
quickly; human beings' inability to avoid sin led them to make decisions that were completely
opposed to God's will, and thus bad for the world overall. However, Augustine's attempts to
answer these questions did not end the theological debates about Genesis 3 concerning the
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meaning of sin, materiality, and death. Though the Western Church would adopt much of
Augustinian thought, thinkers like Thomas Aquinas would provide new insight and new
interpretations.

Chapter Three: After Augustine: The Western Middle Ages and Thomistic Aristotelianism
Though Augustinian theology became predominant in the Western Church during the
early Middle Ages, there were always opponents to Augustine's interpretation of
original sin.”28 Still, as ecumenical councils sought to defeat perceived heresies in Christianity
such as Arianism, and as decisions on what constituted Christian “orthodoxy” crystallized,
Christianity aimed to provide a Christian culture in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages
even if that was not always the reality. Some theological positions certainly gained widespread
acceptance. Augustine's doctrine of “original sin,” though it had faced opposition, enjoyed
general acceptance in the Western Church of the early Middle Ages where the Church saw it as a
central responsibility to teach peoples about their sinful nature and lead them to salvation in
Christ. Yet dissension had not disappeared, and as the Great Schism between East and West made
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abundantly clear, theological debate had not ended. Even in the West, where Augustinian
conceptions of “original sin” had taken root, new understandings of “original sin” and what it
truly entailed emerged. But instead of focusing on materiality or the will, this time the arguments
were concerned with the legal status of sin.
In the tenth to twelfth centuries of the Common Era of the Western churches, sin became
not only a psychological or biological problem, but also a legal one. The Western Church
emphasized that human nature was inherently handicapped because of sin. Reiterating
Augustine's thought, the church taught that human nature “continued to be the nature that God
himself had created and that he did not despise; but on account of the 'stains of marriage...' 'the
unclean seed' that gave him [man] his existence also imposed on him the inevitability of sin.”29
Because Adam had passed his sin down to his descendants, all of humanity had inherited his
nature and would continue to do so through sexual reproduction. And unfortunately, no one was
immune. Stressing the sexually inherited nature of sin, “original sin was the sin that was 'present
in the infant as soon as it [had] a rational soul,' the term 'original' referring not to the origin of the
human race, which was pure, but to the origin of each individual person.”30 Yet where the
Western Church took this doctrine even farther was into the belief that sin was not merely an
inheritance that kept humans from holiness or perfectibility; rather it signified that human beings
were in the middle of the world's greatest battle between good and evil in which their souls were
at stake.
In the Western Middles Ages, “original sin” became such a significant and necessary
component of church dogma because of the story it told concerning humanity, God, and the devil.
This cosmic interpretation of human creation has appeared in other sects outside of Western
29
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Christianity, such as Russian Orthodoxy, but this interpretation’s importance for medieval
theology cannot be underestimated. Like Origen, several medieval theologians theorized that
before the Fall, the devil and other angels had fallen also, disrupting the order and balance of
God's universe which required God to fix this disorder by creating a good race in mankind. This
idea had appeared already among patristic writers during Late Antiquity, especially under
Gregory the Great (540-604), the Roman Pope from 590 to 604 CE, who developed the idea that,
after Adam and the woman had sinned in the Garden of Eden, “[t]he devil had acquired rights
over fallen humanity, which God was obliged to respect... [and the] only means by which
humanity could be released from this satanic domination and oppression was through the devil
exceeding the limits of his authority, and thus being obliged to forfeit his rights.”31 The devil had
to give up his rights to humanity when Christ defeated him by taking the form of a perfect
physical man, dying, coming back to life, and then entering the very gates of Hell to save
humanity. It was an act of divine deception that depicted Jesus as “Christ the victor” who “after
dying upon the cross... descended to hell, and broke down its gates in order that the imprisoned
souls might go free.”32 Yet despite the fact that this depiction of Christ became popular in the
Middle Ages, some medieval theologians objected to the idea that God had used deception or
that the devil held dominion over humanity. Whereas Gregory the Great had emphasized that
Christ's death had acted as a ransom, the medieval theologian Anselm's theology of atonement
aimed to argue a different understanding.
An 11th century Benedictine monk and the eventual Archbishop of Canterbury, Anselm
(1033-1109) was fundamental in connecting “original sin” with the idea of atonement. Rejecting
Gregory the Great's belief that God would ever use deception to do good, Anselm instead argued
31
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that God had created humanity in a state of original righteousness in order to provide eternal
blessedness, which was contingent upon obeying God. When “original sin” made humans unable
to obey, because of their corrupted will, God's just purposes had been frustrated, for which there
had to be a remedy. Humans' sinfulness had disrupted God's justice and therefore, there had to be
legal satisfaction. To fully illustrate this understanding, Anselm defined sin as a legal
transgression, and satisfaction as a legal satisfaction that atoned for the debt of payment that the
transgression had incurred:
To sin is to fail to render to God what God is entitled to. What is God entitled to?
Righteousness, or rectitude of will. Anyone who fails to render this honour to God, robs
God of that which belongs to God, and thus dishonours God. And what is satisfaction? It
is not enough simply to restore what has been taken away; but in consideration of the
insult offered, more than what was taken away must be rendered back.33
Although Anselm had aimed to diminish the emphasis on God's wrath, his emphasis on the
“satisfaction” of sin due to the legal infraction suggested an analogy that made it appear as if
man was on trial with God as the judge, Satan as the accuser, and Christ as the defender. God
was not wrathful, but a righteous judge and mankind had committed an “offense” against him for
which reparations had to be made and God's justice demanded a paid ransom.
The transformation of “original sin” into what arguably looked like “original offense,”
was the result of many social and political changes in Western Europe and the Western Church.
Though this is still debated, some scholars believe that the explicitly legal language of God's
satisfaction and Christ's sacrifice had origins in Germanic customs of the wergild, “whereby a
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crime against a person [had to] be atoned for in accordance with the station of that person.”34 Not
only does the wergild imply a payment or ransom, but it was also always a payment for murder.
Another possible source of influence could have been the penitential system which was
developing in the Western Church. In this system, if a sinner sought forgiveness, he “was
required to confess every sin. [And in] pronouncing forgiveness, the priest would require that the
penitent should do something (such as go on a pilgrimage or undertake some charitable work) as
a 'satisfaction.'”35 This attitude towards satisfaction and justice was also found in feudal society
where vassalage had determined strict structures of loyalty and duty to one's vassal, and perhaps
also explained why Anselm depicted God as “the lord of the manor”36 to whom everything was
due. The Western Church had undergone significant transition through Western Europe's own
political and social transformation. The combination of Roman law, Germanic village culture,
feudalism, and warring principalities had created a society in which Christians had to develop
new understandings of what it meant to be Christian. Much like the way the philosophical,
cultural, and political climate had influenced the theology of Augustine and his predecessors, the
evolving culture of Western Europe affected Western Christianity. Thomas Aquinas would
attempt to provide new understandings by marrying the new legal analogy of sin and satisfaction
with the Aristotelian conception of the soul and the Augustinian notion of “original sin.”
An Italian Dominican priest born in the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
significantly affected Western Christian theology when he combined Aristotelian ideas of the
soul and the body, natural law, and Augustinian theology. Having lost of some its influence
during the Post-Augustinian Middle Ages, Aristotelian thought became crucial to Aquinas'
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understanding of the soul in relation to God and to physical creation. Aquinas argued that man
was defined by the intellectual principle of rationality, or his rational soul, “[f]or the soul [was]
the primary principle of [mankind's] nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise
of [man's] understanding.”37 Adopting Aristotle's theory that humans understood because the
intellectual principle was their nature, Aquinas theorized that the “proper operation of man as
man [was] to understand.”38 Aquinas' emphasized that man was man because of his unique soul,
and that although the body was not inherently bad or evil, “[t]he nobler a form [was], the more it
[rose] above corporeal matter, the less it [was] subject to matter, and the more it [excelled] matter
by its power and its operation.”39 The body and the soul were unified for the soul was “the act of
a body, etc., because it [was] by the soul that the body [was] a body, and [was] organic, and [had]
life potentiality.”40 Through this understanding of hylomorphism Aquinas relied on Aristotle's
emphasis that a man's individual soul was fundamental in order to understand ethical actions and
decision-making, which would become important for understanding why man sinned. Aquinas
believed that God had bestowed humankind with a rational soul in order to know God and to
know the natural law, which encouraged man to act according to reason. This understanding of
natural law and reason would inform Aquinas' understanding of “original sin,” suggesting that
the human will was not completely corrupted or deficient in its decision-making.
Though Aquinas emphasized that God had created man with a rational soul that directed
him to act according to reason and the natural law, man had damaged himself when he had
chosen a bad praxis, to use Aristotle's language. Man was the pinnacle of God's creation because
he was intended to act according to reason, unlike other animals. When man “departed from the
37
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path of reason... he [was] likened to the beasts who are led by the impulses of sensuality,”41 a
belief that had concerned the Stoics and Augustine. Adam and the woman had followed these
sensual impulses in the Garden by picking the fruit from the forbidden tree. Calling this lex
peccati (the law of sin), Aquinas argued that Adam had deviated from reason by following the
impulse to eat from the forbidden tree instead of listening to the law of reason which stipulated
obedience to God. This law of reason had been in effect:
And so the law of man, which, by the divine ordinance, [was] allotted to him according to
his proper natural condition, [was] that he should act in accordance with reason; and this
law was so effective in man's first state, that nothing either outside or against reason
could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God he fell under the
influence of his sensual impulses.42
Utilizing Aristotelian philosophy once again, Aquinas seemed to imply that Adam's deliberation
or pre-choice (phroneisis) was more important than his actual taking of the fruit (praxis). Adam's
deliberation in considering to disobey God appeared to be the true first sin. However, though
related to Augustine's argument that sexual desire was in some ways a deviation from reason and
evidence of divine punishment, Aquinas did not see this law of sin as resulting in a completely
corrupted will. The “[n]atural good [had been] corrupted inasmuch as man's nature [was]
disordered because man's will [was] not subject to God's,”43 but sin had created other problems
more important for Aquinas. Humankind was deficient not merely because the will had been
corrupted but because “man [incurred] a triple loss by sinning... stain, corruption of the natural
good, and debt of punishment.”44 Like Augustine, Aquinas did believe that humankind had been
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infected with a “stain” that was irrevocable and which denied humankind the ability to avoid sin.
Before Adam and the woman had eaten from the tree they had been able to avoid sinning
because “to sin [was] nothing else than to stray from what [was] according to [their] nature,”45
but after the Fall their nature had become corrupted. As the stain on the soul's rational character,
“original sin” resulted in a corrupted human nature that was deficient in its understanding of God,
deficient in its ability to follow natural law, and in need of grace and Christ's satisfaction for the
“debt of punishment.” The human soul was stained, the will had become corrupt, and the body
had incurred a debt, but as the stainless, sinless, and holy physical son of God, Christ could grant
satisfaction and repair this loss.
This medieval conception of “original sin,” Aristotelian in part and legal in part, carried
on the tradition of the Augustinian emphasis on an inherited corrupted will in human nature.
However, though Aquinas acknowledged a debt to Augustine's influence, his reliance on
Aristotelian thought led him to argue that human nature was not completely corrupted by sin.
Humankind could do bad and good because it was like a sick person who could sometimes move
despite its illness and could be cured through medicine. A sinful nature did not equate to utter
depravity, instead it required healing. Moreover, though Aquinas infused some of the medieval
legal understandings of sin into his work, he argued that “[t]o sin [was] nothing else than to fail
in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature,”46 which was actually “more
corrupted by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.”47
Humankind was still capable of knowing God, even if imperfectly, which would enable it to do
some good. This reasoning resulted in what is arguably a more hopeful and compassionate view
towards human beings than some of Aquinas' peers and predecessors had. And though Aquinas
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agreed that “[a]ll men alike, both guilty and innocent, die[d] the death of nature... because of
original sin,”48 Aquinas did not dwell on the death and corruption that had resulted from
“original sin.” Nor did he see “original sin” as the sort of offense that depicted man simply as a
spiritual criminal who needed Christ's satisfaction in order to make up for his crime. Instead,
Aquinas saw the same just God who had given man an intellectual and rational soul as the one
who had died in order to heal that soul:
I reply that a proper satisfaction comes about when someone offers to the person offended
something which gives him a delight greater than his hatred of the offense. Now Christ by
suffering as a result of love and obedience offered to God something greater than what
might be exacted in compensation for the whole offense of humanity; firstly, because of
the greatness of the love, as a result of which he suffered; secondly; because of the worth
of the life which he laid down for a satisfaction, which was the life of God and of a
human being; thirdly, because of the comprehensiveness of his passion and the greatness
of the sorrow which he took upon himself... And therefore the passion of Christ was not
only sufficient but a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race.49
Aquinas' depiction of God was that of judge and redeemer who desired restorative justice rather
than simply legal justice. Aquinas had carried on the legal understanding of atonement theology
and Christ's sacrifice, but his reliance on Aristotle and his reworking of the Augustinian image of
corrupt human nature enabled him to paint a much more compassionate and magnanimous
picture of God's intent for mankind than what some of his medieval peers had developed.
Like Augustine, Aquinas' interpretation of Genesis 3 and the Fall was not able to
sufficiently answer all of the questions that I posed after my own reading. The questions
48
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remained: 1) why is the woman unnamed? 2) How is the serpent convincing?; 3) When does
death enter the scene?; 4) Why is nudity a marker?; 5) Why do things degenerate so rapidly?; and
6) When does sin exactly enter the story? Aquinas certainly attempted to tackle some of these
questions, particularly by constructing the Summa Theologica as an explanatory review of
Genesis, from the beginning of creation to the Fall. This construction seemed to lead him to
Augustine's belief that the emergence of sin appeared in Genesis 3 when Adam and the woman
ate from the forbidden Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. From this reading he argued that
Genesis 3 was the beginning of a corrupted human nature and rational soul that could not
completely follow natural law. But Aquinas' reading did not seem to imply a story of
degeneration in which man became worse after leaving Eden. Aquinas saw death as a result of
“original sin” but did not seem to read the Genesis narrative as an increasingly horrific tale of
escalating sin. Nor did he seem very preoccupied with the fact that Eve remained unnamed for
most of Genesis 3 and was the first to speak to the serpent. In fact, she did not play much of a
character at all in his reading and for that reason, I chose to imitate Aquinas' use of the term
“man” instead of “human” in order to highlight this emphasis. Perhaps Aquinas' broad review of
Genesis and his decision to overlook some of these aspects speaks to the possibility that he was
far more concerned with portraying a holistic picture of God, mankind, and Christ's role than
performing a careful exegesis of Genesis the way Luther would later do. Hoping to utilize the
non-Christian Aristotle, the Christian Augustine, and the medieval views of atonement theology,
Aquinas seemed much more inclined to provide an overall depiction of God's work in the world
and how “original sin” fit into that scheme. This would change significantly with the Protestant
Reformation.
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Chapter Four: The Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther, and Individual Sin
In the three centuries after Aquinas' death, much had changed in Western Europe and was
continuing to do so. The Late Middles Ages was a time of severe turmoil as historic famine
(1315-1317) and the Black Death (1348-1350) led to dramatic depopulation. By 1453,
Constantinople, the capitol of the surviving Byzantine Empire, fell to the increasingly powerful
Ottoman Empire, and new trade routes and exploration had begun to expand Europeans into
“new worlds” ripe with land and profit, as well as alternatives to Christianity. With the fall of
Constantinople, displaced Byzantine citizens immigrated to provinces of Italy, bringing with
them the texts that would help inspire the Renaissance. With the Renaissance began the emerging
precepts of humanism and scientific inquiry that started to become part of intellectual discourse
alongside theology, sometimes causing real tension. Change, both bad and good depending on
one's perspective, was enveloping Europe, and Christians were filled with both fear and hope.
A product of this upheaval, Martin Luther encapsulated the unease of this chaotic time
period. Anti-Eastern, anti-Islam, anti-Judaism, and death-obsessed, Luther reacted strongly to the
changes that were sweeping Europe. Having lived “amid recurring onslaughts of the disease later
to be called the Black Death,”50 and writing after his predecessors, John Wycliffe and Jan Hus,51
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Luther lived in a time of serious evolution. Not only had feudalism begun to crumble with early
forms of capitalism and mercantilism taking its place, but papal conflicts and corruption had also
sullied some of the Catholic Church's reputation and unity. The advent of the printing press
proliferated new knowledge, and systems and institutions that had once been ingrained in
medieval society showed signs of dissolution, cultivating a new sense of uncertainty, as well as a
new sense of individuality. Grappling with this uncertainty, Luther's concerns became those of
faith, personal salvation, and individual autonomy apart from the Catholic Church. Devoting
himself to Augustinian theology, the original Greek and Hebrew biblical texts, especially the
Pauline epistles, Luther portrayed a portrait of the completely sinful and helpless human being
who could only rely on his or her own faith and the grace of God to be merciful in an uncertain
and “fallen” world. This existential concern with sinfulness and damnation had begun with
“original sin.”
Although Luther's conception of “original sin” would differ somewhat from Augustine's,
Augustinian theology had a tremendous effect on the German monk at a time when
Augustinianism was facilitating serious theological debate.52 The emergence of humanism had
cast serious doubt on Augustinian views of humanity and the Fall, prompting some scholars like
Erasmus (1466-1536) to return to earlier theologians such as Origen, to whom Erasmus
attributed a more sympathetic and peaceful version of humanity. Like Luther, Erasmus was also a
biblical scholar. But in contrast to Augustine's and Luther’s reliance on predestination, “Origen
had even suggested that, in the end, God envisaged that everyone, including the Devil himself,
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would be saved and return to paradise.”53 This was the view in which Erasmus and some other
humanist scholars were in favor. But other theologians such as Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples (14551536) and Cardinal Gasparo Contarini (1483-1542), both of whom wrote shortly before Luther,
“stressed the total irrelevance of human works in God's salvation of humanity,”54 stressing the
Augustinian viewpoint that humans were damned without God's divine grace. Luther fully
accepted the latter theology. Beginning his theological study at the Order of the Augustinian
Eremites in Erfurt, Luther was indebted to Augustine from the very beginning. Rebelling against
the Catholic Church's via moderna - a theological perspective that proposed that humans did
have some capacity to work towards their own salvation – and suspicious of Aristotelian
Thomism (especially Aristotelian reason), Luther began to turn to the Pauline Epistles and
Augustine's interpretations in order to understand salvation.55 This reliance on Paul and
Augustine's own readings of him would cement Luther's theology, particularly with regard to sin.
Luther's devotion to the Pauline Epistles and his skills in Greek and Hebrew exegesis
helped him develop an individualistic and more personal theology that concerned the relationship
between God and each human, a relationship that had been irrevocably damaged for many
because of “original sin.” However, it is important to read Luther's commentary on Genesis first
in order to understand how he pictured the story of “original sin.” Unlike Augustine and Aquinas,
Luther could read Hebrew and Greek, and was therefore able to read the original biblical texts.
Luther was for the most part, a literal reader – which would have serious consequences for his
later followers and all of Protestantism – and he read Genesis thoroughly, paying close attention
to aspects of the story that many had overlooked. But what is most significant about Luther's
commentary on Genesis was his depiction of Adam and the woman, for this would greatly affect
53

Ibid, 113.
Ibid, 111.
55
Ibid, 117-118.
54

34
his “original sin” conception. For Luther one of, if not the most, distinguishing factor about
Adam was that he had been made in the image of God, and therefore was not meant to devote his
life to pleasure and satisfaction the way other animals did. Echoing some of the anti-materiality
sentiments of the early Christian period, Luther wrote that:
For godly teachers well affirm that if Adam had not fallen God would have translated him
from an animal life to spiritual life after a certain number of saints had been perfected.
For Adam was not designed by his creator to live without food, drink, and procreation.
But all these corporeal things would have ceased at an appointed time.56
Luther emphasized Adam's perfection as the first human in order to show what life had
been like for humans before the Fall, and to contrast this state to the “fallen” world. Before the
Fall, Adam had been “endowed... with a twofold life: an animal life and an immortal life,”57 the
latter of which would have been Adam's future eventually if he had not sinned. Adam had been
wholly pure in his reason and his will and Adam had possessed “charming security, without any
fear of death, and without any care or anxiety whatever.”58 Although Luther elevated Adam's
purposes for an ultimately spiritual life, Luther did also present a physically perfect image of
Adam and the woman. Luther argued that Adam had probably possessed superhuman abilities
like sharper eyesight, incredible strength, and acute senses. He and the woman, whom Luther
called Eve, were both beautiful just like the earth which had also been safer, brighter, healthier,
and more peaceful. Although Eve was beautiful and righteous and her and Adam's wills had been
in perfect harmony, Eve still “did not equal the glory of the male creature... [though she was] not
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excluded from all the glory of the human nature.”59 Luther also believed that Adam and Eve had
probably had sexual intercourse, although his Augustinian background stressed that Adam would
have had “the most pure and confident mind towards God... [with] a will most obedient to God,
[and] a soul the most free from all impurity of thought.”60 Differentiating between the two,
Luther compared Adam as man to the sun and Eve as woman to the moon; both were important
and beautiful, but the sun was ultimately superior. It was true “that Adam possessed it [God's
image] in its moral substance or nature; that he not only knew God and believed him to be good,
but that he lived also a life truly divine, that is, free from the fear of death and of all dangers and
happy in the favor of God.”61 But despite this wonderful existence, Adam still existed “in a
middle state... a state of neutrality of liability... where he could be deceived by Satan; and could
fall into awful calamity.”62 Adam and Eve had been in the process of becoming perfect and
immortal, but when they sinned they had failed the ultimate test.
For Luther, sin equated to unbelief or a lack of faith. By disobeying God and believing
the serpent instead of God, Adam and Eve had committed the “original sin.” Luther did not see
sin as merely an act of the body or the will, such as the picking of the fruit. Luther emphasized
that “[t]he word sin in the Bible means something more than the external works done by our
bodily action. It means all the circumstances that act together and excite or incite us to do what is
done; in particular, the impulses operating in the depths of our hearts.”63 Unlike Augustine,
Luther did not see sin as a corruption of the will, he saw it as a corruption of all “flesh.” Adam
and Eve had fallen into sin because of their unbelief, and as a result, they had become sinners, a
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state in which there was “complete destruction of body and soul.”64 Flesh included the body, the
senses, the will, the reason, and the soul, meaning that Adam and Eve had damned themselves
and all of their descendants because they “transmitted sin to us [humans] through our earlier,
physical birth.”65 Luther saw this as a quick succession of depravity and destruction as Adam's
and Eve's descent into a “fallen” nature meant that they and their descendants would act
according to the “flesh,” meaning, “[t]he progression of generation… [was] lowered and
weakened beyond description; and it [was] so absorbed in lust that it differs little from the
generation of the beast.”66 For Luther, this explained why things had degenerated so quickly in
Genesis, why it had devolved to the point where God wanted to destroy humankind and regretted
his creation. Adam and Eve had possessed the opportunity to become perfect and immortal, but
their lack of faith had introduced sin and they would never be able to escape it.
“Original sin” was imperative to Luther because of what it had done to the relationship
between humans and God, a struggle that he believed plagued every single person and resulted in
a fate worse than death. Sin's consequences had been resoundingly destructive. Believing that all
human beings were eternally damned because of sin, Luther compared the sinful person to a
prostitute who had defiled herself and needed to be cleansed, just as Paul had done in 1
Corinthians.67 But cleansing oneself from sin was impossible, particularly because Luther
interpreted God's warning in Genesis 3 that He would put enmity between the serpent and
humans, as the symbolic and eternal struggle between humans and sin. Unbelief was “the head of
the serpent”68 that humans fought against until Christ could crush it. But although Luther saw
64

Ibid.
Ibid, 28.
66
Martin Luther. “Genesis I, Part VI. God’s Work on the Sixth Day.” The Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin
Luther. Ed. John Nicholas Lenker. Minneapolis: Lutherans in All Lands Co., 1904. 127. Online.
67
Martin Luther. “Martin Luther on Justifying Faith.” Ed. Alister E. McGrath. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
229-230.
68
Martin Luther. “Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans.” Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings. Ed.
65

37
“original sin” as Adam’s and Eve's unbelief, he also focused on its consequences, which were
worse than sin itself. “Original sin” had created the constant fear of death in which humans were
“never confident and happy in God, [for] fear and dread in the highest [were] perpetually
trying”69 human beings. Anxiety “and the like evils [were] the image of the devil, who [had]
impressed his image upon [humankind].”70 These mixtures of evils however, were merely
symptoms of the ultimately most horrific consequence, which was God's wrath.71 Luther had
noticed the heavy presence of death like the ancient church fathers and theologians. Yet
interestingly, “[a]lthough death was a fate that man shared with all other creatures, human death
was unique [for Luther] because it was a consequence of sin and of divine wrath.”72 Luther was
much more concerned with the fact that Adam and Eve had disobeyed God and upset his justice
than the fact that they had brought death. Death was only the beginning but God’s punishment
afterward was eternal. Plagued by this realization and the absolute fear that accompanied it,
Luther tried to sort out what this dilemma meant for every single human being who had inherited
“original sin.”
Unlike Aquinas, who had portrayed the story of “original sin” and Christ’s sacrifice as a
holistic story that eventually resulted in God’s restorative justice for humankind, Luther
illustrated a portrait of “original sin” as the individual struggle for each human being and his or
her salvation. “Original sin” had completely corrupted human nature, and Luther emphasized
that there was absolutely nothing humans could do about this. All a person could do was to have
faith in Christ, which coincidentally had to be the result of the gift of grace. Fortunately for some,
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“God put aside his wrath as judge for human beings who he chose as his elect. They received a
gift of faith that had nothing to do with their own sinful actions.”73 This “gift” was the only way
one could eventually rid themselves of the effects of “original sin” after death:
[Faith] unites the soul with Christ (voreynigt auch die seele mit Christo), as a bride is
united with her bridegroom. From such a marriage, as St. Paul says (Ephesians 5:31-2), it
follows that Christ and the soul become one body, so that they hold all things in common,
whether for better or worse… The soul possesses lots of vices and sin; these now belong
to Christ. Here we have a happy exchange (froelich wechtzel) and struggle. Christ is God
and a human being, who has never sinned and whose holiness in unconquerable, eternal
and almighty. So he makes the sin of the believing soul his own through its wedding ring
(braudtring), which is faith, and acts as if he had done it [i.e., sin] himself, so that sin
could be swallowed up in him… Christ, the rich, noble, and holy bridegroom, takes in
marriage this poor, contemptible and sinful little prostitute (das arm vorachte boetzes
huerlein), takes away all her evil, and bestows all his goodness upon her!74
Through his reinterpretation of Genesis, Luther was able to paint “original sin” as the
beginning of humans’ weakened relationship with God. “Original sin” was not simply a story of
when the human will had become corrupted or when humans’ reason and understanding of
natural law had become deficient. It was the story of what had happened when the first man and
first woman had divorced God, when their faith had evaporated in the face of temptation like the
prostitute. Luther had rejected the Thomistic interpretation which stressed that humans could still
do some good and know some of God, and had instead adopted the Augustinian emphasis on
corruption, extending this corruption to the entire being. For Luther, this was not so much a bad
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situation for the whole world as it was for each person. Here he departed from both Aquinas and
Augustine. The physical world’s fate paled in comparison to the individual’s broken relationship
with God, to the individual’s salvation, which was in now in serious jeopardy. “Original sin” was
a frightening story for Luther, a nightmare that symbolized what happened when humans
relinquished their faith and gave in to the devil, who was always lurking in the corner, just like
sin. The only hope Christians could possess was that God would declare them righteous and thus,
justify them despite their inherent sinful state. Yet even this fate was uncertain because it was
entirely contingent upon God’s grace. No one, not even Luther, could know his fate, making
one’s life an eternally difficult and uncertain struggle for spiritual survival like that of the
prostitute that only Christ could save.
Luther’s story was not Aquinas’. Luther had departed from the Thomistic interpretation
that aimed to focus on God’s love and mercy. “Original sin” had happened and its effects were
destructive, but there was hope in the restorative justice God had achieved through Christ. Luther
had opted instead for a story that focused on God’s wrath, a fact that would mean eternal
punishment for many. But for those whom God had chosen, God’s grace meant a spiritual
marriage that trumped the sort of marriage one could find on earth. Desacralizing marriage and
many other aspects of Christian life in the physical world, Luther emphasized that for those who
had received God’s grace, the only thing that mattered was one’s relationship with Christ. Adam
and Eve had divorced themselves from God through “original sin,” but some of their descendants
would be reunited with Christ.
Luther’s conception of “original sin” certainly colored his theology, but for our purposes,
what is significant is how it attempted to answer the questions with which Genesis left us. 1)
Why is the woman unnamed? 2) How is the serpent convincing?; 3) When does death enter the
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scene?; 4) Why is nudity a marker?; 5) Why do things degenerate so rapidly?; and 6) When does
sin exactly enter the story? Oddly enough, Luther does not really answer the first question. When
he first discusses the woman he calls her “his [Adam’s] wife Eve.”75 Yet Luther’s discussion of
the woman does seem to indicate that she is unnamed because she was for some theologians, like
Luther, a theological nuisance.76 Like Paul’s story, Luther was more concerned with the line
running from Adam to Christ, making Eve somewhat obsolete. But if she was not important, then
neither was Mary, whose worship was insignificant for Luther. Though Luther did not seem to
explicitly answer this question, his lack of attention towards it perhaps stems from the fact that
he had emphasized the inherent inferiority of Eve. She was indeed the moon, but the sun was
more important.
Of course, the woman had become a nuisance because she had listened to the serpent who
was convincing because “Satan employed [it] in his temptation of Eve.”77 Like Augustine and
Aquinas, Luther ultimately blamed Satan for acting through the serpent and tempting Adam and
the woman. Luther considered Satan a very real force who actively took a role in making sure
humans did not have faith. Nudity was a marker in the story because of its connection to
sexuality. Because sin had caused such a destruction of the entire human being, it had also
heightened the awareness of sex and the actual sexual drive. After Adam and the woman had
sinned, their nudity was significant because the naked form now “awaken[ed] in [humans] shame
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and inflame[ed] us with evil lust and passion.”78 The shame of their nudity after they had eaten
highlighted the contrast between their innocent, pure sexuality and the depraved sexuality they
inherited after becoming sinners. However, Luther provided the best and most extensive answers
to the third, fifth, and sixth questions. Sin had entered the story the moment Adam and the
woman had listened to the serpent and divorced God, not when they necessarily ate. This
“original sin” of unbelief was the impetus that then began the process of degeneration and death,
and led to a progressively worse humanity. And though Luther emphasized that sinful actions
and their consequences would increase from the new sinful state that Adam and the woman had
appropriated, the consequence of death had become a reality when God banished them from the
Garden of Eden, and He reminded Adam that he would return to the earth as dust. This
interpretation of the Genesis story – so perfectly representative of the fear and pessimism that
shadowed Luther – would be instrumental for later Protestants. It would also provide Friedrich
Nietzsche with the perfect antagonist which he would try to defeat.
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Chapter Five: Nietzsche and the Will to Dismantle “Original Sin”
Luther’s views on Christianity quickly swept across several parts of Western Europe,
taking root in countries that had previously been part of the Roman Church. But Luther was not
the only ‘reformer’ to challenge the doctrines and practices of the Roman Catholic Church.
Protestant leaders such as John Calvin (1509-1564) and Huldrych Zwingli (1484-1531), as well
as the movements they and others inspired (Calvinism, Anabaptism, Puritanism, etc.), were
instrumental in revolutionizing the religious landscape of Western Europe. Reform certainly had
occurred, but deep dissension and conflict had also erupted, resulting in religious wars and
violence of such magnitude that some Western European intellectuals in the 18th century began to
consider the virtues of a secular state that either ridded itself of religion or allowed citizens to
worship in any denomination they chose. Yet the rise of secularism and the development of
modern states did not mean the death of religion in Europe. The Council of Trent (1545-1563)
and subsequent Roman Counter-Reformation inspired a revitalization in the Catholic Church,
whereas countries and provinces that (fell under the sway of one of the major) Protestant
denominations developed new religious cultures, adopting the traditions of Calvin, Zwingli, or
Luther. However, though not all European countries adopted Protestantism, Luther’s ideas about
the individual’s relationship with God, as understood through the prism of his interpretation of
“original sin,” had an indelible effect on Early Modern Western Christian culture. This was the
culture that Friedrich Nietzsche so vehemently criticized.
Nietzsche had been born into a family and province that had adopted Lutheran
Christianity. Born “in the heartland of the Protestant Reformation [in Rocken]… about seventy
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kilometres from Eisleben, the birthplace of Martin Luther, ”79 Nietzsche’s father, Ludwig, was a
pastor in the Lutheran Church. Ludwig’s grandmother, Erdmunthe, had come from a long line of
Lutheran Church pastors.80 Yet even though Nietzsche insisted that he had not come from “a
fundamentalist or puritanical background,”81 his critiques of Christianity often strongly hinted at
a culture that had been infused with some of Luther’s harshest commitments. In Human, All Too
Human, Nietzsche criticized the dilemma of the ‘every day Christian’ for “[i]f Christianity were
right in its tenets of a vengeful god, general sinfulness, predestination, and the danger of an
eternal damnation, it would be a sign of stupidity and lack of character not to become a priest,
apostle, or hermit, and with fear and trembling, work exclusively on one’s own salvation.”82
Some of these tenets were and are still present in various denominations of Christianity not
exclusive to Lutheranism, but it is hard to ignore that Luther, like Paul, emphasized God’s anger,
the completely sinful nature of humans, predestination, and the threat of eternal damnation.
Nietzsche on some occasions specifically blamed Luther and his followers for stalling some of
the achievements of the Renaissance, for the Reformation’s ressentiment against humanism. Not
only had Luther and other reformers inspired “an energetic protest of backward minds who had
not yet had their fill of the medieval world view and perceived the signs of its dissolution… with
deep displeasure,”83but they had also “delay[ed] the complete awakening and rule of the sciences
for two or three centuries, as well as making impossible, perhaps forever, the complete fusion of
the ancient and modern spirit.”84 Luther’s reading of Genesis and the conclusion that he had
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drawn from it about man’s utter depravity not only ran completely counter to the tenets of this
new humanism, but also lined up with Nietzsche’s criticism that it was “a trick of Christianity to
teach the worthlessness, sinfulness, and despicableness of man in general so loudly that disdain
for one’s fellow men becomes impossible.”85
It was the Lutheran emphasis on humans’ utter depravity and state of sinfulness that
partly drove Nietzsche to criticize the concept of sin, particularly “original sin.” Nietzsche saw
this apparent in Luther’s theology but he also saw some of the Augustinian emphasis on sin in
the medieval Christianity that had preceded and influenced Luther. Nietzsche was aware that
other Christians, besides and before Luther, had emphasized humans’ sinfulness. He eviscerated
Eastern and Western saints, and Catholic believers like Pedro Calderon de la Barca whose
infamous quote that “the greatest guilt of man is that he was born,” was for Nietzsche, the
“craziest paradox there can be.”86 Nietzsche criticized the emphasis on sinfulness as a ploy that
Christians had used in order to argue for this version of salvation and redemption:
It is the device of religion, and of those metaphysicians who want to think of man as evil
and sinful by nature, to have him cast suspicion on nature and to make himself bad; for he
learns thus to experience himself as bad, since he cannot take off the dress of nature.
Gradually, after a long life of nature, he feels so oppressed by such a burden of sins that
supernatural powers become necessary to lift this burden; and with that, the need for
redemption.87
Though Lutheran Protestantism had ridded itself of many Catholic practices and some
beliefs, it had married Luther’s conception of “original sin” with the atonement theology that had
developed in the medieval period. As I showed in the chapter on Aquinas, atonement theology
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relied on the belief that Adam’s and Eve’s mistake in the garden had made all humans by nature
guilty of trespassing against God. Nietzsche observed that the “advent of the Christian god, the
‘highest potency’ god yet conceived by man, [had] been accompanied by the wildest
dissemination of the sense of indebtedness, [and] guilt.”88 Examining the relationship between
“original sin” and Christ’s sacrifice, Nietzsche blamed human beings’ psychological
predisposition towards guilt for Christianity’s assurance that “the curse [fell] upon man’s causa
prima (‘Adam,’ ‘original sin,’ the ‘bondage of the will’); or upon nature, which gave birth to man
and which is now made the repository of the evil principle.”89 “Original sin,” as Nietzsche
conceived it, not only taught Christians that they were completely and helplessly sinful merely
because they were human, but that they also owed God a debt for being the human descendants
of Adam and Eve. Nietzsche was convinced that “[j]ust as man [had] inherited from the blood
aristocracies the concepts good and bad… so he [had] inherited from the tribes, together with the
tribal gods, a burden of outstanding debt and the desire to make final restitution.”90 These
qualities of utter depravity and atonement made “original sin” a masochistic and damaging story
for Nietzsche, one that he would attempt to dismantle with his own re-reading of Genesis.
Nietzsche first began examining the creation story in Genesis 3 by comparing it to
another creation story. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche fleshed out the Ancient Greek myth of
Prometheus, who created humans from clay and then gave them fire so they could build
civilization. In the Greek myth, Prometheus had defied Zeus by giving humans fire and as
punishment, hence Zeus banished Prometheus to Tartarus where an eagle would eat his liver
every day after it had regenerated overnight. Nietzsche theorized that the Prometheus myth had
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“the same importance for the Aryan91 mind as the myth of the Fall [had] for the Semitic, and that
the two myths [were] related as brother and sister.”92 Just as the Prometheus myth illustrated
cultural values and beliefs about the divine and the origins of human beings, so did the Genesis
story. Both revealed key understandings about the relationship between humans and gods, which
was for Nietzsche, the “huge boulder [lying] at the gateway to every culture.”93 But Nietzsche
distinguished between the two creation myths because of their contrasting qualities that revealed
very different conceptions of human resistance as rebellion against the divine.
Nietzsche’s rehearsal of divine disobedience in the Prometheus myth, allowed him to
examine the role of sin in Genesis 3. Though both stories illustrated that “[m]an’s highest good
[had to] be bought with a crime and paid for by the flood of grief and suffering which the
offended divinities visit[ed] upon the human race,”94 Nietzsche saw very different values at work
in the two myths. Prometheus was a hero in his myth, but in the Genesis story Adam and the
woman were neither. Instead:
[The Fall myth] exhibit[ed] curiosity, deception, suggestibility, concupiscence, in short, a
whole series of principally feminine frailties, as the root of all evil. What distinguishes
the Aryan conception is an exalted notion of active sin as the properly Promethean virtue;
this notion provides us with the ethical substratum of pessimistic tragedy, which comes to
be seen as a justification of human ills, that is to say of human guilt as well as the
suffering purchased by that guilt… The individual, in the course of his heroic striving
towards universality, de-individuation, comes up against that primordial contradiction and
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learns both to sin and suffer. The Aryan nations assign [crime to the male], the Semites
[sin to the female gender]; and it is quite consistent with these notions that the original act
of hubris should be attributed to a man, original sin to a woman.95
Though in the Greek myth, Prometheus had been punished, storytellers considered his
disobedience a good thing not only because of how it helped humanity, but also because his
motive was to help humanity. Nietzsche specified that the Prometheus myth contained a tragic
conception, in which one’s tragic decision led to suffering but also to the possibility of
transformation, where humans were able to experience through Prometheus’ rebellion. Though
this tragic conception looks somewhat similar to Irenaeus’ interpretation, in that it focused on the
transformation of humanity, Nietzsche seemed to base his understanding of Genesis closer to
Augustine’s or Luther’s interpretation. For Nietzsche, Genesis 3 was entirely opposed to the
tragic Prometheus myth due to its conception of sin and motive. Even though the text suggests
that Adam and the woman ate because they wanted knowledge, presumably, to be like God,
Nietzsche theorized that the myth treated these motives as evil, and necessary preludes to
suffering, instead of moral striving in order to enable human knowledge.
By comparing the two myths and their values, Nietzsche also paid significant attention to
the treatment of the woman in Genesis 3. Unlike most of the other thinkers we have encountered
thus far, Nietzsche neither ignored the woman nor took it for granted that she was to blame.
While she had not played much of a role in Aquinas’ reading, and Augustine and Luther had
highlighted her moral inferiority and seductive capabilities, Nietzsche noticed that “[while the]
Aryan nations assign[ed] [this] crime [to] the male, the Semites [assigned]… sin [to] the female
gender… the original act of hubris [was] attributed to man, original sin to a woman.”96 This not
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only suggests that Nietzsche’s reading was probably influenced by Luther and Augustine, but
also that his reading unveiled a gender bias in the story that many feminist theologians would
later also critique. Why was the woman to blame? Why had the serpent approached her first and
not Adam? Nietzsche seriously posed these questions, finding them indicative of the problems
inherent in the Fall myth. The woman’s placement in the story would only fuel the belief “that
‘every evil comes into the world through woman.’”97
Nietzsche would continue this investigation into the importance of gender relations to the
Genesis story in Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche began the text with a question for philosophy:
“Supposing truth is a woman – what then?”98 If truth was a woman, how should one approach
her? How should one pursue her? Should one ever let her go, and if so, when? Nietzsche posed
these questions, but then complicated the issue by making a connection between Eve and her role
in the garden. She is the one who listens to the serpent, hears the promise of knowledge, and then
decides to pick the fruit. She is the first to pick from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.
One could argue that she is the first philosopher. But her decision and Adam’s compliance
produce catastrophic results that seem to say something about the pursuit of knowledge, or
“truth,” as well as the dynamics of the male-female relationship. Nietzsche explored this idea by
once again turning to Greek myth.
Nietzsche’s reading of the Genesis story led to the belief that Adam’s and Eve’s
relationship was flawed, but not for the same reasons that the previous three theologians would
have articulated. He saw this flaw by comparing it to the Greek myth of Dionysus and Ariadne.
The daughter of King Minos of Crete, Ariadne was significant in Greek mythology for the role
she played in helping the hero Theseus. After falling in love with Theseus at first sight, she
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decided to help him kill the Minotaur, her half-brother, and helped Theseus escape from the
labyrinth. But when Theseus and Adriane left Crete together, he abandoned her on the island of
Naxos. While there, Dionysus found her, and according to some legends, married her. But unlike
Adam, Dionysus did not stay with Ariadne. As Nietzsche explained:
Thus he [Dionysus] once said: “Under certain circumstances I love what is human” – and
with this he alluded to Ariadne who was present – “man is to my mind an agreeable,
courageous, inventive animal that has no equal on earth; it finds its way in any
labyrinth. I am well disposed towards him. I often reflect how I might yet advance him
and make him stronger, more evil, and more profound than he is.”99
Dionysus did care for Ariadne, but he was willing to let her go. As the god who was “a
philosopher,”100 he sought out truth, but could recognize the circumstances when it was no
longer worth the pursuit. If truth was a woman, this meant he would also have to let go of her
when it was time. This did not make him unfaithful and selfish, however, in Nietzsche’s eyes.
Dionysus’ treatment of the woman as truth was an example of his “courage, his daring honesty,
truthfulness, and love of wisdom.”101 From Nietzsche’s perspective, this was how the ideal
philosopher was supposed to treat truth, and how the man was supposed to treat woman.
One of the problems with Genesis, according to Nietzsche, was that Adam had not treated
Eve in this fashion. When God had found them and subsequently, banished them from the garden,
Adam and Eve stayed together and began reproducing. Adam remained faithful despite Eve’s
actions and the effects that they had caused. But instead of seeing this as faithful and loyal,
Nietzsche saw this as a mistake that did not face the realities of woman or the duties of
philosophy. Nietzsche theorized that like the philosopher who stubbornly kept pursuing truth
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without any regard to its nature, Adam had stayed with Eve when instead he should have let her
go. This was how one was supposed to treat a woman. Yet the “original sin” story was not only
problematic for its characterization of the first woman, but also for its treatment of knowledge.
As Nietzsche continued writing, his critique of Christianity and “original sin” became
ever-more scathing. In The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche castigated Christian morality, institutions, and
its teachings about the nature of humankind. This brought Nietzsche once again to the subject of
“original sin” and the creation story in Genesis 3. Now Nietzsche not only saw a strange story
that paled in comparison to the Prometheus myth, but even more, a story in which God had
punished his “blunders” for seeking out knowledge, or “science.” Nietzsche depicted God’s
actions in Genesis 3 as that of an insecure and fearful deity who did not want his creation to have
knowledge or freedom. God had not created humans because he loved them and wanted to share
his earth with them. Instead, “[t]he old God, all ‘spirit,’ all high priest, all perfection,
promenade[ed] in his garden: but [was] bored.”102 But when Adam also became bored, God
created woman, “God’s second blunder,”103 for when the woman entered the world,
“[c]onsequently, science too [came] into the world through her’… Only through woman did man
learn to taste the tree of knowledge.”104 Drawing upon his earlier criticisms in The Birth of
Tragedy, Nietzsche depicted what he believed was the foolish set-up of Genesis 3. God had
created humans because he was bored and when they had become naturally bored as well, he
panicked:
A mortal terror seized on the old God. Man himself had become God’s greatest blunder;
God had created for himself a rival, science makes equal to God – it is all over with
priests and gods if man becomes scientific! – Moral: science is the forbidden in itself – it
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alone is forbidden. Science is the first sin, the germ of all sins, original sin. This alone
constitutes morality. – ‘Thou shalt not know’ – the rest follows. – God’s mortal terror did
not stop him from being shrewd. How can one defend oneself against science? – that was
for long his chief problem. Answer: away with man out of Paradise!105
Nietzsche had discerned another layer in Genesis 3: God made humans, and when they
discovered knowledge, he banished them from Eden because knowledge rivaled his power.
“Original sin,” the “first sin,” had been the quest for knowledge, science. Nietzsche did not
depict Adam and the woman as disobedient and unfaithful the way other theologians had. Instead,
Nietzsche placed the blame on God. When Adam and the woman had sought out science and
knowledge, God punished them, making it appear as if such desires were evil. In fact, Nietzsche
agreed that the quest for knowledge was against God, but that reflected poorly on God, not Adam
and the woman. Instead of fostering and encouraging the search for knowledge and science and
independence, God “invent[ed] distress, death, the danger to life in pregnancy, every kind of
misery, age, toil, above all sickness – nothing but expedients in the struggle against science!
Distress does not allow man to think…”106 God had not wanted Adam and the woman to flourish,
so he had punished them. The quest for science was thus the “original sin,” and thus Nietzsche
believed it to be not only ridiculous, but also a deleterious idea for human beings.
Nietzsche’s depiction of “original sin” as science is actually surprising, considering that
he was quite critical of modern science. Why would he have then depicted the quest for science
as a natural and noble cause? Perhaps Nietzsche’s emphasis on Adam’s and the woman’s desire
for knowledge meant to emphasize the human aspect of the story. Nietzsche was concerned with
how the story had characterized human nature, how it depicted curiosity and the natural desire to
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know more. Nietzsche wanted to highlight what he saw as the unfairness of the story. The
Genesis creation story displayed for him what was one of the essential problems with
Christianity: its denial of human nature. It seemed odd and foolish to Nietzsche that a god who
claimed to love his creations would punish them for being what they were. Connected to his
critique of morality, Nietzsche saw Genesis 3 as indicative of Christianity’s attempt to subvert
nature under this kind of morality. For this reason, Nietzsche examined many aspects of the story
that dealt with human nature and “morals” – knowledge, obedience, faithfulness, relationships,
and the differences between men and women – and found them all troublesome.
The question we are left with after reading Nietzsche’s interpretation of “original sin” is
why it is pertinent to the Western tradition of the concept. Nietzsche’s attitudes towards and
critiques of Christianity were exceedingly complex, too much so to do them justice here.
Nonetheless, Nietzsche is one of the most significant modern critics of Christianity, and was for
some time, a follower of Christianity himself. Like the three thinkers before him, Nietzsche’s
critique provided some answers to the Genesis story, even if he also was unable to fully answer
all of them. Again, my questions are: 1) why is the woman unnamed? 2) How is the serpent
convincing?; 3) When does death enter the scene?; 4) Why is nudity a marker?; 5) Why do things
degenerate so rapidly?; and 6) When does sin exactly enter the story?
While Nietzsche’s insights into the gender dynamics of the story did not necessarily
reveal why the woman was unnamed, he did acknowledge her role in a way the three theologians
before him had not. Perhaps she was unnamed because the she had brought sin into the world or
perhaps because she was not “truth” yet. Though still unclear, it is significant that Nietzsche
lifted her up as an active character and highlighted the inferiority theologians had often bestowed
upon her. She was much more sympathetic in Nietzsche’s reading, a trait that also perhaps
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explained why the serpent had been convincing. The serpent had promised something that human
beings naturally desired, for which they constantly searched. In Nietzsche’s eyes, if anyone was
to blame for Adam and the woman’s disobedience, it had been God. Nietzsche believed that
God’s immaturity and insecurity were why things had also degenerated so rapidly. God had not
wanted Adam and Eve to have knowledge, so he decided to introduce pain and death into the
world to make it that much harder to learn. For Nietzsche, the Genesis story did not reflect
poorly on Adam and the woman, but on the one who had created them.
However, the most interesting answer that Nietzsche attempted to provide concerned
when sin came into the story. For Nietzsche, although he had deemed “original sin” as the first
attempt at science, his project was to refute the very idea of sin. By highlighting how masochistic
and unnatural it was, Nietzsche wanted to show how the idea of “original sin” was a lie, a lie that
had done nothing but intimidated people from living out their natural desires and instincts. Why
had nudity been such a marker? Because “original sin” was supposed to make Adam and the
woman guilty for being in their natural state. For Nietzsche, the concept of ‘original sin’ had
allowed Christianity to convince people that they were depraved and guilty merely for being
human, something he could never accept. “Original sin” was not part of a story about the corrupt
human will, or Christ’s love, or the worthless and hopeless state of man. For Nietzsche sin,
original or otherwise, did not exist.

EPILOGUE
By performing a critical reading of Genesis 3 and examining four major interpretations of
it, I have presented a reception history of “original sin.” Despite the popular conceptions
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surrounding “original sin,” I have highlighted not only some of the intricacies and nuances of the
biblical text but also the dynamic and fluid nature of the story as it has developed among
different thinkers. As this paper has shown, four major thinkers who have contributed to
“original sin” story in the Western tradition have been Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas,
Martin Luther, and Nietzsche. Amid their various social locations, theological commitments, and
historical settings, each provided readings that aimed to understand what “original sin” was and
how it connected to human beings. Augustine had determined “original sin” was the corruption
of the will, Aquinas, a deficient ability to know God, Luther, a depraved and hopeless humanity,
and Nietzsche, human beings’ first attempt at seeking knowledge. Together, these interpretations
provided some of the answers to the questions with which I began my inquiry: 1) why is the
woman unnamed? 2) How is the serpent convincing?; 3) When does death enter the scene?; 4)
Why is nudity a marker?; 5) Why do things degenerate so rapidly?; and 6) When does sin exactly
enter the story? Whether anyone will ever answer all of these questions remains to be seen.
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